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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PARTIES' CONTRACT 
BECAUSE THE PROPERTY WAS AND IS UNMARKETABLE DUE TO LACK OF 
LEGAL ACCESS. 
The Jacksons take the position throughout their brief that 
there was legal access to the north lane during at least some of 
the time relevant to this action; making the property marketable 
and the Mostrongs7 action for rescission unjustified. Nothing 
could be farther from the true state of the record. 
It is undisputed, when the Jacksons entered into the trust 
deed with the Mostrongs on September 1, 1987 and, two years later, 
on September 1, 1989, when the trust deed became due, that the 
Jacksons had not provided any legal, recorded means of access to 
the property. It is equally undisputed that, in January of 1990, 
Security Title Co. caused Geraldine Kessler, the original grantor 
of the property, to execute deeds purporting to grant an easement 
in the north lane to the Mostrongs. The language in this deed and 
the preceeding deeds is also undisputed. 
. As the basis for their claim that an easement was actually 
conveyed, the Jacksons rely upon the following language in each 
original deed: "TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO a 33 foot easement 
over and across the East 33 feet of said property for road and 
utility purposes." (Appellee's Brief p. 6) Wayne M. Pinder, an 
expert witness, however, gave uncontroverted testimony that Ms. 
Kessler's deeds actually conveyed no easement interest to the 
Mostrongs because the language relied upon by the Jacksons only 
conveyed an easement to each purchaser over the east 33 feet of his 
own property for road purposes, but did not reserve any rights in 
the road in Geraldine Kessler, herself. (T. 347-48, In 21-14; T. 
351, In 2-5) Without such a reservation, Geraldine Kessler had no 
rights in the road to convey to anyone, including the Mostrongs. 
These deeds, accordingly were only an illusory solution to the 
problem; they did not succeed in conveying a legal right of access 
to the Mostrongs. 
The Jacksons rely upon Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 2d 
226, 507 P.2d 710 (Utah 1973), to suggest that the quoted language 
of the deed created a reservation of rights in Ms. Kessler. 
Burton, however, does not support the Jacksons' point: 
An exception excludes from the grant the property or 
estate therein described. If a conveyance contains a 
reservation, the entire property or estate described 
passes to the grantee subject to the right, estate, or 
easement reserved. The reservation creates a new right 
issuing out of the property granted, which did not exist 
as an independent right before the grant. 
Id. at 712. There is no language in the relevant documents which 
explicitly create a reservation in Geraldine Kessler for an 
easement to the road in question. The quoted language does not 
create an exception either; it creates only a road easement to the 
eas/t 33 feet of the particular parcel of property and nothing else. 
The Jacksons further rely upon Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 81 
Utah 355, 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933), to support their argument that 
the Kessler deeds should be interpreted according to the 
"circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the 
parties, the state of the thing granted, and the object to be 
attained." Id. at 294. (Appellee's Brief p. 29) Stevens refers to 
inapplicable facts and irrelevant law, so is not useful in 
interpreting the Kessler deeds. The factual setting of Stevens 
concerned the extent and purpose of an indisputably existing 
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easement, as opposed to the present attempt to create an easement 
about which the relevant documents are silent. Stevens also deals 
with the legal principle of parol evidence. Although parol 
evidence is relevant to interpret ambiguous contractual language, 
it is not admissible where there is no ambiguity on the face of the 
document. See Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976, 
977-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Where there is no language reserving 
an easement in the present deeds, there is no ambiguity to 
interpret and Stevens is of no assistance. 
The Jacksons allege that no one ever contested the right of 
the Jacksons or the Mostrongs to use the north lane for access to 
the property, and raise the related argument that the Mostrongs had 
an easement by implication to the road. In support of these 
arguments, the Jacksons refer to the testimony of the manager of 
Security Title, who "felt there was an implied easement due to the 
work he had done on the property and the intention that there was 
an implied easement to the north." (Appellee's Brief p. 10). 
Whi,le such facts would be useful evidence in establishing the 
existence of an access easement in an appropriate legal action, 
they, in and of themselves, do not create a legal, recorded 
easement. Such facts do not eliminate the necessity of bringing an 
action to obtain the legal, recorded access easement to which the 
Mostrongs were entitled, and which Lee Roy Jackson led Larry 
Mostrong to believe existed. 
There is no dispute that the Jacksons obtained title insurance 
through Security Title, and that Security Title procured the 
Kessler deeds. The Jacksons go to great lengths to argue that 
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legal access was provided by means of this title insurance because 
the insurance specifically insured against unmarketability of title 
and because the Earnest Money Agreement stated that the Jacksons 
were to furnish good and marketable title "evidenced by a current 
policy of title insurance." (Appellant's Brief p. 20) 
First, as pointed out in detail in appellant's brief, 
insurable title is not necessarily marketable title, and a 
purchaser of real property is entitled to rescind a contract if the 
title is unmarketable even if insurable. Brown v. Yacht Club of 
Coer D'Alene, Ltd, 111 Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1986). 
Although a title insurance policy shows that the property is 
insurable, which is evidence probative of the conclusion that the 
property is probably marketable, the policy does not, in and of 
itself, make the property marketable. Title insurance is designed 
to indemnify a property holder should he or she become involved in 
litigation respecting the marketability of his title, but does not 
guarantee that there will be no such litigation. See Valley Bank 
& Trust Co. v. U. S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 
935-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A purchaser of real property is not 
obliged to purchase a potential lawsuit. Brown, 722 P.2d at 1065. 
Notably, the Earnest Money Agreement did not provide that a policy 
of title insurance could be provided in lieu of conveying good and 
marketable title. 
The Jacksons7 reliance upon Holmby. Inc. v. Pino, 647 P.2d 392 
(Nev. 1982) , to show that a purchaser was not justified in 
rescinding a contract because he was fully protected by a policy of 
title insurance, (Appellee's Brief p. 22), is not justified here. 
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The factual situation in Holmby is distinguishable as follows: 
There was an unsatisfied trust deed encumbering the property at the 
time the buyer was to tender his down payment into an escrow 
account. There would have been, however, sufficient funds in the 
escrow account to pay off the trust deed, as well as a policy of 
title insurance, so there was no evidence that the seller would not 
have been able to deliver marketable title. Accordingly, the 
buyers rescission was not justified. In contrast, even though 
there was a policy of title insurance available in the present 
situation, the Mostrongs never did receive a legal, deeded access 
easement to the property and the title continued, during all 
relevant times, to be unmarketable. Furtehr, there is no policy of 
title insurance in effect on the defective Kessler deeds. (A. 13, 
In 16-21_) 
Accordingly, the Jacksons' conclusion that "it [Security 
Title] effectively cured any question regarding the *recorded 
easement' requested by FHA,11 (Appellee's Brief p. 29) not only begs 
the. question but is false. In short, the Jacksons never delivered 
legal access to the property to the Mostrongs, in blatant breach of 
their covenant to convey marketable title. The Mostrongs should, 
accordingly, be entitled to rescind the contract. 
II. THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THE 
JACKSONS DELIVERED UNPINANCEABLE PROPERTY TO THEM. 
As discussed at length in the Mostrongs' main brief, the 
Jacksons failed to deliver financeable property in two ways: 
First, the property not only did not have a legal, deeded access, 
but did not have access by means of a dedicated county road within 
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three hundred feet of the house; and second, the construction of 
the house was substandard. These reasons for denial are well 
attested by the loan application records, (T.220, Ex. 2S; T. 39, 
41, Ex. 7; T. 52, Ap. 41-42, Ex. 17) 
A. The Preponderance of the Evidence Indicates That The 
Property Was Unfinanceable Because Of Lack Of Approved 
Access. 
The Jacksons make the incredible argument that the property 
was not denied financing because of "lack of access." (Appellee's 
brief p. 24) This is simply not true. Kent Dalton, the manager of 
Security Title, testified that he had a telephone conversation with 
Linda Whiteman in which he learned that the appraiser had rejected 
the property "because of lack of recorded access." (A. 10, In 7-
13; A. 22, In 16-19) It is patently obvious from the record that 
the property was rejected for financing by First Security Bank 
because it was not located within three hundred feet of a publicly 
maintained road. This is clearly a problem for which "lack of 
access" was the term used throughout the trial. 
The Jacksons attempt to evade the access issue by asserting 
that Judy Hardinger of Valley Central Bank did not seem to think 
that access was an issue. (Appellee,s Brief p. 24) The Jacksons' 
assertion is misleading because the access issue had, at least 
initially, been resolved at the time Judy Hardinger considered the 
property because she was aware of the Millard County Commission's 
letter indicating that the county was willing to accept the 
Tuckfield road. (A. 42-43, In 25-11) Further, Joseph Stott's 
testimony indicates that the access was, indeed, a concern for 
Valley Central Bank. He testified that he imposed a requirement, 
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namely, that "documentation needs to be provided showing that the 
subject has access by a county road or deeded easement," (T. 119, 
In. 19-21), because of this concern. 
The Jacksons make the remarkable claim that the Mostrongs' 
obtaining an easement over the south road was inconsistent with 
their position that the south road was the bargained-for access. 
(Appellee's Brief p. 34) First, this claim makes no sense on its 
face. Second, it is indisputable that the south road was the major 
access in that: (1) It was the shortest distance to a county road, 
being three times shorter than the north lane; (2) it was improved 
while the north lane was nothing but a poorly maintained, rutted, 
dirt lane; and (3) it was the primary means of access used by all, 
including the Jacksons. In fact, the Jacksons were responsible for 
creating and improving the south road in the first place. (T. 237, 
In 14-23) If the north lane was the primary means of access, the 
Jacksons presumably would have improved the north road instead. 
Third, because of the above factors, the south road was the only 
access that was a reasonable candidate for county dedication; it 
would have been prohibitively expensive to improve the north lane 
to the point where it would qualify for county dedication. When 
the Mostrongs discovered there was no easement to the south road, 
the busied themselved in obtaining one. If this was not the major 
access to the property, it is inconceivable that they would have 
spent time and money to obtain this easement. Their behavior, 
contrary to the Jacksons' assertion, was entirely consistent with 
their belief that the south road was the bargained-for access. 
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As to the Jacksons' assertion that the Mostrongs "voluntarily" 
obtained the easement to the south road, (Appellee's Brief p. 32), 
the Mostrongs took what effort they could to obtain a qualifying 
access because the Jacksons were apparently unwilling to do so, as 
shown by their letter refusing to be liable for any expenses of 
obtaining an access easement or improving it. (T. 43, Ex. 15) 
The Jacksons assert that the Mostrongs obtained the Tuckfield 
easement "at no cost to themselves," (Appellee's Brief p. 32), 
apparently in an attempt to show that there was really not an 
access problem. This assertion is not true. First, there is no 
evidence on the record as to whether Ralph Tuckfield charged the 
Mostrongs for the easement. Even if he did not, however, obtaining 
the easement was not without cost to the Mostrongs. The Mostrongs 
hired attorney Brent Bullock to obtain this easement. Mr. Bullock 
charged the Mostrongs for his services. Even had the Mostrongs 
obtained the easement at no cost, however, the Jacksons' duty to 
provide both legal and financeable access to the property is not 
diminished. 
The Jacksons claim that Millard County accepted the south road 
unconditionally, and that no improvements were required. Whether 
Millard County was going to require the Mostrongs to bring the 
south road up to county specifications is equivocal on the record. 
According to the county attorney, who physically held the Tuckfield 
deed pending the upgrading of the road to county standards, 
upgrading was required, although the County Commission letter 
tentatively agreeing to accept the road did not state any 
conditions. (T. 248-50) It is clear, however, that the dedication 
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was never formally completed. Regardless of whether a requirement 
to upgrade was or would have ultimately been imposed is not 
important; what is important is that, from the Mostrongs' 
perspective in the spring of 1990, such a requirement could be 
imposed, and it might be expensive. That the Mostrongs and, in 
fact, the Jacksons, had such a concern is unequivocally illustrated 
by the record: Jennifer Mostrong testified that, because of this 
concern, she contacted the county about road specifications and 
then requested a bid for upgrading the road from Reed Penney, (T. 
56-57), who obtained specifications from the county. (T. 204, In. 
9-12). The Jacksons pointed out that Lee Roper, the county 
official in charge of road maintenance, did not remember this 
conversation with Jennifer Mostrong. This testimony is not 
dispositive of the issue, but may show only that Ms. Mostrong spoke 
with someone else or that Mr. Roper did not remember a brief 
conversation that had occurred over two years before. Finally, the 
Jacksons* concern, as set forth in their letter, that " [w]e 
(Ja.ckson'rs) [sic] will not be liable for any cost of the Mostrong's 
[sic] obtaining . . . upgrading of road," belies their argument 
that the parties believed that no upgrading was or ever could be 
required. 
Because the two major briefs have set forth in detail the 
evidence supporting the trial courts finding that the county did 
not require the road to be upgraded, it is not necessary to 
reiterate it here. This evidence does not, however, negate the 
very real concern that the parties had in the spring of 1990 that 
such a requirement might be imposed. Had the Mostrongs reasonably 
9 
believed that they might be responsible for bringing the road up to 
county standards, which reasonable belief the record supports, they 
could also reasonably feel that this was more of an expense than 
they had bargained for in purchasing the property and, accordingly, 
be justified in rescinding the contract. 
The Jacksons point out that Reed Penney did not inspect the 
road prior to entering his bid. (Appellee's Brief p. 33 n. 5) 
What the Jacksons failed to point out was that Reed Penney was 
intimately familiar with the condition of the road because the 
Jacksons had hired him to do the initial grading and improvements 
only a few years before. (T. 2 37) 
In summary, despite their misleading and erroneous factual 
assertions, the Jacksons have failed to demonstrate that the 
preponderance of the evidence does not indicate that the property 
was not financeable because of problems with access. 
B. The Preponderance Of The Evidence Shows That The Property 
Was Unfinanceable Because Of Substandard House 
Construction. 
The second reason that financing was not available was because 
of the substandard construction of the house. 
The Jacksons make the outrageous and totally unsupportable 
assertion that "nowhere in the record is it established that the 
Mostrongs were denied financing because of the home construction." 
It is obvious from the record that the reason Valley Central Bank 
denied financing on the house was because of the construction of 
the house. (A. p. 41, In. 2-18; T. 52; Ex. 17) It is equally 
unreasonable for the Jacksons to assert that the UBC standards are 
irrelevant; Joseph Stott, appraiser for Valley Central Bank, 
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testified that the primary construction standard used by both FHA 
and conventional underwriters, including himself, is the UBC. (T. 
120-121, In. 17-5). 
The Jacksons argue that the house construction was not 
deficient because the Mostrongs lived in the house for over two 
years without complaining about it. (Appellee's Brief pp. 47-48) 
What the Jacksons do not point out is that the construction of the 
house only became an issue in June of 1990, when the house was 
turned down for financing because of these defects. Experience 
should indicate that a house may be habitable but not up to code. 
To summarize, the Jacksons failed to deliver property which 
was reasonably financeable. That the court concluded otherwise, in 
the face of almost overwhelming evidence to the contrary, is not 
evidence that the Jacksons delivered financeable property. The 
record indicates that the parties believed that the property would 
be financeable and that the only obstacle to financing was the 
necessity that the Mostrongs establish a two-year income history in 
Utah. This is a reasonable precondition and assumption underlying 
the parties' contract. When the Jacksons failed and refused to 
deliver such property, they breached their contractual obligations. 
The Mostrongs, therefore, should be entitled to rescind the 
contract. 
III. FINANCING WAS NOT REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO THE MOSTRONGS. 
The Jacksons rely upon the trial court7s finding No. 13 as 
evidence that financing was reasonably available to the Mostrongs. 
Because the trial court's findings are precisely what are at issue 
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here, such reliance is totally improper. Further there is 
inadequate factual basis for the trial court's finding. 
The trial court apparently relies upon the alleged 
representation of the Zions Bank loan officer to the Mostrongs that 
Zions would be "willing to loan the Mostrongs money to purchase the 
property after they established a stable income over a two-year 
period." (Appellee's Brief pp. 8-9 f 13) This alleged statement 
does not, however, indicate that financing was reasonably available 
on the property. 
At the time this representation was allegedly made, the 
Mostrongs had not yet qualified for a loan and could not have 
qualified for a loan because they had not met the two-year 
residency requirement. The statement was not set forth on a 
contractual basis, and no consideration was given for it. The 
reality is that this representation was in the nature of a 
condolence by the loan officer — "I am sorry that you did not 
qualify for a loan this time, but come back and try again in two 
yea,rs." It was not a guarantee and did not mean that Zions would 
unequivocally and unconditionally offer financing at a later date. 
Had the Mostrongs reapplied at Zions, they would have applied 
for an FHA loan. The property had been rejected for FHA financing 
when the Mostrongs applied through First Security Bank. Linda 
Whiteman, the First Security Loan Officer, testified that she felt 
they "had exhausted all possibilities of approving an FHA insured 
mortgage." (A. 33, In 8-9) Because the underwriter's requirements 
will not vary regardless of the financial institution applied 
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through, the property would have also been rejected by the FHA had 
the Mostrongs applied through Zions' Bank. 
The trial court and the Jacksons rely upon the fact that the 
Mostrongs did not apply for financing between September 1, 1987 and 
September 1, 1989 to support their conclusion that the Mostrongs 
did not diligently attempt to obtain financing. They not only 
ignore the fact that the Mostrongs inquired as to the possibility 
of obtaining financing in August of 1988, but conveniently overlook 
the fact that the reason for the two-year trust deed was to allow 
the Mostrongs to establish a two-year income history in Utah as a 
prerequisite for obtaining financing, which period was to begin on 
September 1, 1987 and end on September 1, 1889. 
The trial court's and the Jacksons7 apparent reliance upon the 
inference that the problems with the property were ultimately 
resolved as of June 1990, making financing easily available, 
distorts the record. They rely upon the facts that the Mostrongs 
had obtained a letter of acceptance from Millard County and had the 
Tuckfield deed for the south road, and that the Jacksons had 
offered to pay the cost of repairs on the house. The record, 
however, shows that the problems were not, in fact, resolved as of 
June 1990. 
Although the problem of the south road easement and acceptance 
appeared to be substantially resolved as of June 1990, there was a 
substantial probability, as discussed in detail above, that the 
road dedication could cost the Mostrongs several thousand dollars, 
if dedication was made conditional upon bringing the road up to 
county standards. The issue, therefore, was not resolved as far as 
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the Mostrongs were concerned. Further, Joseph Stott's testimony, 
in which he stated that he required some proof of dedication or 
easement before financing could be offered, indicates that the 
issue was not fully resolved, in view of the fact that the 
dedication was not complete at that time. 
It is undisputed that the Jacksons apparently wrote a letter 
offering to pay the expense of correcting some of the structural 
defects of the house. Notably, there were more than three or four 
defects according to Joseph Stott's testimony: 
The only heat in the kitchen, living room and family room 
are wood, are the wood stoves. One bath is not vented. 
Hot water heater wired as needs to be placed in a 
conduct, [sic] The supports underneath the home are wood 
and on grade level. I could not determine if they are 
set on a concrete footing because black vinyl had been 
laid on the ground. The footings for the supports should 
be stand up [sic] eight inches for termite protection. 
(T. 119, In 9-16) This letter was apparently never communicated to 
the Mostrongs, so the Mostrongs did not respond to it. For the 
issue to have been resolved, however, the Jacksons would have had 
to have actually performed the repairs by June of 1990 for the 
house to qualify for financing. 
Financing may have been more available to the Mostrongs had 
the Jacksons not been so anxious to foreclose on the property. The 
Jacksons noticed up no less than three trustee's sales between 
March and June of 1990, during which time the Mostrongs were 
attempting to resolve the problems with the property created by the 
Jacksons and apply for financing. Although these sales were 
continued by the Jacksons at the insistence of Mr. Bullock, the 
Mostrongs could not have felt, in June of 1990, even if the 
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problems with the property had been resolved, that there was 
sufficient time to apply again for financing. 
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs should have gone back to 
First Security Bank, after obtaining the acceptance letter from the 
Millard County Commission in June of 1990, because they would have 
then qualified for the FHA loan. By June of 1990, the application 
had lapsed and a new application and appraisal would have had to be 
done. This would have cost the Mostrongs another $300 and taken at 
least another month before an initial determination as to the 
availability of financing could have been available. (A. 28-29, 
In. 25-8; A. 48, In. 5-8) The Mostrongs reasonably felt that they 
did not have this much time. 
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs did not qualify for 
financing because of a collection action against them. Not only 
was there no trial court finding on this issue, but such an 
argument directly contradicts the Jacksons' position that financing 
was reasonably available to the Mostrongs. Nevertheless, while 
there were several questions as to Mostrongs' credit, including 
several tax liens and a $39.00 collection action, none of these 
were sufficient to prevent the Mostrongs from obtaining financing. 
Judy Hardinger, the loan officer at Valley Central Bank who dealt 
with these issues, testified that if the Mostrongs paid and 
resolved these issues that would have resolved the problem, and 
that there were a number of good items in their credit history. 
(A. 43-44, In. 14-13) Ms. Hardinger testified that the tax liens 
were, in fact, cured. (A. 46, In. 22-25). In short, these were not 
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substantial issues and would not have resulted in the denial of 
financing absent the structural defects of the house. 
The Jacksons raise the specious argument that the Mostrongs 
could never have satisfied the two-year verification of income 
requirement because Larry Mostrong worked in California for part of 
the time. Larry Mostrong had Utah as his official residence, 
however, and paid income taxes in Utah. The location of his work 
was not relevant. 
The Mostrongs had already expended substantial resources in 
the attempt to correct the defects in the property and obtain 
financing despite the defects. The Jacksons, simultaneously, were 
making continual demands for additional money and constantly 
noticing trustee's sales. Under such adverse circumstances, all of 
which were created by the Jacksons, it is unreasonable for the 
Jacksons to say, on the one hand, that the Mostrongs could have 
gotten financing if they had only worked harder and spent more 
money curing problems created by the Jacksons, and then argue that 
they should not be entitled to rescind the contract because 
financing was reasonably available. 
IV. THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BACAUSE THE 
JACKSONS MADE MATERIAL FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE PROPERTY TO THEM. 
The Jacksons assert that the Mostrongs did not marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial courts findings relating to this 
issue. In fact, the Mostrongs did so in their principal brief, 
albeit not as thoroughly as should have been done because of the 
brief length limitation. To resolve all doubts, however, a 
reiteration of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
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following the elements set forth in Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 
P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (for elements, see Appellant's 
Brief p. 37), follows: The representations at issue were made to 
the Mostrongs by Lee Roy Jackson, according to own testimony, and 
dealt with three facts: (1) The north lane, at the time of sale, 
was the legal access to the property; (2) the south road, at the 
time of sale, was a private lane which was permissively used; and 
(3) the house, at the time of sale, was either FHA approvable or 
approved. The only evidence on the record which would indicate 
that these representations were not false, at the time they were 
made and at the time of sale are the facts relating to constructive 
and adverse easements over both the north lane and the south road, 
that there was no building code in effect at the time the house was 
built, and Lee Roy Jackson's testimony that he made no 
representations regarding the construction of the house. The court 
made no findings as to inducement, the Mostrongs' reasonable 
reliance upon Lee Roy Jackson's representations, or the Mostrongs' 
damages. (The evidence relied upon and the citations to the record 
supporting them are laid out in detail in both parties' major 
briefs.) 
The Mostrongs presented evidence sufficient to satisfy all of 
the prongs of the Wright test, as is shown by the discussion in 
Appellant's Brief on pp. 37-42. Nevertheless, in response to the 
Jacksons' query (Appellee's Brief p. 35), the following evidence 
supports elements 2, 3, 7, and 8: 
Elements (2) and (3) are shown as follows: Among other 
things, in December, 1990, more than two years after the 
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representations had been made, Jennifer Mostrong discovered that 
there was no recorded access easement to the property, either to 
the north or to the south, and that there never had been. (T. 41-
42) Lee Roy Jackson, himself, testifed that he knew he did not 
have a recorded easement to the south road, knew the property had 
been sold, and had not requested permission from the new owner to 
use the road. (T. 133-134) (Please refer to appellants Brief pp. 
38-39 for full discussion.) 
Elements (7) and (8) are shown by Larry Mostrong's testimony 
that he sought information regarding the access issue from Lee Roy 
Jackson and then relied upon the information provided, and the fact 
that he purchased the property in the face of his testimony that he 
would not have done so had he known that it was landlocked. 
(Please see Appellant's Brief pp. 39-41) 
The preponderance of the evidence favors the position of the 
Mostrongs and works against the trial court's findings on many of 
the elements of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. The 
only evidence on the record for several elements, however, are the 
conflicting testimonies of the Mostrongs and Lee Roy Jackson. For 
a finding to be proper, it must be based upon credible evidence. 
For evidence to be credible, it must be clear and convincing. 
Nordstrom v. Miller. 227 Kan. 59, 605 P.2d 545, 552 (1980) . 
The term "clear and convincing evidence" means: [t]he 
witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible; the 
facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly 
remembered; the details in connection with the 
transaction must be narrated exactly and in order; the 
testimony must be clear, direct, and weighty; and the 
witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at 
issue." 
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Id. (quoting Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, 
Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 596 P.2d 816, 824 (1979)). 
While the Mostrongs7 testimonies have these characteristics, 
Lee Roy Jackson's does not. Lee Roy Jackson's testimony is totally 
untrustworthy because he explicitly contradicted himself on several 
material facts and did not clearly remember significant details. 
Please refer to Appellant's Brief pp. 34-37 for a full discussion 
of this issue. (Please note that there was a typographical error 
on p. 36, lines 21-25 of Appellant's Brief. These lines should 
read: (4) Last but not least, Lee Roy Jackson testified that he 
told the Mostrongs he had a legal easement to the south road, (T. 
245) , and then turned around and flatly denied that he had ever 
told them that he had an easement to the south road. (T. 281)) 
The Jacksons attempt to discredit Larry Mostrong's testimony 
by stating that "Larry Mostrong testified that Lee Roy Jackson 
stated that the construction of the home was *FHA approvable' and 
then contradicted himself by stating that Lee Roy Jackson 
represented construction of the house was "FHA approved." 
(Appellee's Brief p. 36) While there is a difference in the word 
"approvable" as opposed to "approved," there is little, if any, 
difference in the import of the testimony, given the issue of 
whether the property was ultimately financeable. This is hardly a 
discrepancy which should reflect adversely on Larry Mostrong's 
credibility. 
As discussed at length in the Mostrongs' previous brief, the 
Mostrongs had an affirmative right to rely upon Lee Roy Jackson's 
representations about the property. The Jacksons' brief argues 
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that Larry Mostrong read the legal description in the Warranty Deed 
at closing and knew, or should have known, that there was no deeded 
easement to the property• While it is true that Larry Mostrong did 
have access to the legal description, it must be reiterated that 
Larry Mostrong was not a sophisticated purchaser, that he did not 
have any expertise in reading and understanding property 
descriptions, and, given the language relating to easements in the 
Warranty Deed, he would not necessarily have understood that there 
was no access easement included in the document. That Larry 
Mostrong had access to this legal description does not negate the 
Jacksons' responsibility of knowlege, honesty and candor about 
access to the property. Furthermore, if the Jacksons are holding 
Larry Mostrong to the level of technical expertise necessary to 
understand the existence (or lack thereof) of an easement from a 
legal description, the Jacksons should be required to perform to 
the same standard. Because they had access to the warranty deeds 
by which they initially obtained the property and to the Kessler 
deqds, they should be found to have unequivocal and definite 
knowledge that they did not ever have any legal right of access by 
means of the north lane. 
In conclusion, the Mostrongs have marshalled the evidence and 
shown, despite this evidence, that the trial court's findings to 
the effect that Lee Roy Jackson did not make fraudulent or 
negligent misrepresentations of material fact to the Mostrongs are 
not supported by the preponderance of credible evidence on the 
records. The trial court's findings, accordingly, should be 
reversed. 
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V. THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT BECAUSE OP 
THE PARTIES' MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL MISTAKES OP PACT. 
The trial court relied upon essentially the same evidence to 
find that there were no mutual or unilateral mistakes of fact as it 
did to find that there were no fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentations, except for evidence relating to the issue of 
the Jacksons' knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentations. 
Accordingly, the same arguments set forth in section IV of this 
reply brief apply to this issue. 
VI. THE MOSTRONGS ARE ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT. 
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs waited too long after 
discovering the problems with the property to rescind the contract. 
They rely upon Perry v. Wooda 11, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P. 2d 813 
(1968) as precedent for this argument. In Perry. Woodall arranged 
to purchase a pharmacy from Perry. Woodall was operating the 
business when he discovered, on July 18, 1964, that a substantial 
portion of the debt he had purchased was Perry's personal debt. 
Rather than immediately rescinding the contract, he continued to 
operate the business until September 7, 1964, at which time he was 
appointed receiver in an action commenced by one of the creditors 
of the business. He continued to act as a receiver for nearly a 
year and one half more, until January, 1966, at which time he 
resigned and a successor reciever was appointed. Woodall continued 
to operate the business for the successor receiver for nearly 
another two years, until March of 1966, at which time he purchased 
the assets of the business at the reciever's sale. The court found 
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that Woodall's actions were not consistent with an intent to 
rescind. 
In contrast, the Mostrongs did not discover that there was any 
problem with access until December, 1989. They did not discover 
that there were problems with the construction of the house until 
June, 1990. They attempted to rectify the access problem for 
several months, but elected to abandon the property and rescind the 
contract in July of 1998, within a month of discovering the 
construction defects. They brought suit demanding rescission on 
September 17, 1990, only two months after manifesting their intent 
to rescind by abandoning the property. These facts are easily 
distinguishable from those in Perry, making Perry a poor precedent 
for deciding this case. 
The Jacksons argue that the Mostrongs should not be entitled 
to rescind because they did not leave the property for seven months 
after discovering that there was no legal access to it, while, at 
the same time, the Jacksons loudly proclaim that financing was 
reasonably available to the Mostrongs if only they would have 
worked harder to resolve the problems left to them by the Jacksons. 
The Mostrongs acted in good faith in attempting to mitigate the 
damages created by the Jacksons' failure to perform their 
obligation of providing marketable and financeable property. The 
Mostrongs should not be penalized for attempting to work out the 
problems with the property in an attempt to fulfill the contract. 
Public policy dictates that parties should be entitled to work out 
contractual problems for a reasonable period of time after 
discovering a defect, rather than having to immediately rescind at 
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the first possible sign of trouble. Such policy encourages parties 
to work out their problems between themselves rather than resorting 
to litigation. Following the result urged by the Jacksons, in 
contrast, encourages parties to litigate at the slightest 
provocation. 
The Jacksons claim that the Mostrongs should not be entitled 
to rescind the contract because they have lost rent because of the 
Mostrongs' extended occupation of the premises. This is a specious 
assertion. Under Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), rescission damages include the amount paid 
for the property less a reasonable rental value of the property for 
the time the rescinding party was in possession of it. Thus, the 
Jacksons would retain the full rental value of the property for the 
entire length of the Mostrongs' occupation of it, unless this court 
finds that the Jacksons defrauded the Mostrongs, in which case the 
Mostrongs would be entitled to the full amount which they paid for 
the property. Lee v. Armstrong, 798 P.2d 84, 88 (Mont. 1990). The 
Mostrongs discussed this formula in their major brief. The 
Jacksons, accordingly, have no reason to claim this damage. 
The Jacksons further claim that they would be prejudiced by 
rescission because of alleged damage to the property committed by 
the Mostrongs. The Mostrongs are not aware of any evidence on the 
record that they damaged the property. If there is such evidence, 
it is highly contested and the trial court made no finding as to 
this issue. The Jacksons7 claim is, therefore, highly improper on 
appeal. Even if such damage should be found to have actually 
occurred, however, an adjustment for the damage could be made by 
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deducting it from any amount returned to the Mostrongs. This 
argument is improper, unsupported by the record, and does not serve 
to defeat the Mostrongs7 claim for rescission. 
CONCLUSION 
The record indicates that the Mostrongs are entitled to 
rescind their contract with the Jacksons and, accordingly, are 
entitled to the return of their investment in the contract. There 
are several grounds for rescission of this contract, all of which 
are supported by the record, including: (1) The Jacksons7 
contractual breach in failing to convey legal access to the 
property; (2) the Jacksons contractual breach in failing to convey, 
as per the parties7 expectation, property which met underwriters7 
standards of financeablity; (3) Lee Roy Jackson7s fraudulent and/or 
negligent misrepresentations regarding access to the property 
and/or the construction of the house; and (4) the parties7 mutual 
and/or unilateral mistakes of fact in selling and purchasing 
unmarketable and unfinanceable property. The record also indicates 
tha>t the Mostrongs did not sit on their rights, but, after 
reasonably attempting to cure the problems, acted promptly in 
attempting to rescind the contract; and that rescission is the 
equitably proper means of working out a just resolution to this 
problem. Accordingly, the Mostrongs respectfully request that this 
Court overrule the factual findings and legal conclusions of the 
trial court and enter judgment in their favor. 
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